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The main upshot that emerges from my discussion is that the disagreement between different solutions does not challenge the applicability of Bayesian reasoning to centered settings, nor the commitment to Conditionalization, but is instead an instance of the familiar problem of choosing the priors. Moreover, the diachronic Dutch Books against the ‘halfer’ solutions fail to undermine the standard arguments for Conditionalization. ) it is not vulnerable to diachronic Dutch Book arguments. Once the problem is correctly represented, the ‘thirder’ solution satisfies standard rationality principles, vindicating why (. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalization and Reflection. In the following I would continue to use “third-person perspective” but readers can switch that to “objective reasoning” if they wish so. My argument would become that objective reasoning and perspective reasonings should not mix. Objective reasoning would be analytically identical to the third-person perspective. My argument is compatible with this belief.

Readers against perspectivism may disagree with point 1 and suggest we could reason in objective terms without the limit of perspectives. Indexical probabilities such as “the probability that this is the first awakening” or “the probability of me being one of the first 100 billion human beings” also mixes first- and third-person reasonings. Lewisian halving and thirding uses unique reasonings from both first and third-person perspectives. Regarding the sleeping beauty problem the correct answer should be double halving. The paradoxes surrounding anthropic reasoning are caused by the aforementioned perspective mix. Otherwise it could lead to paradoxes even independent of anthropic reasoning. It is my contention that reasonings from different perspectives should not mix. Whereas from third-person perspective I am not fundamentally special comparing to others so a reference class of observers including me can be defined. First-person reasoning allows primitive self identification as I am inherently unique as the center of the perspective. Let’s call these the third-person perspective. A perspective’s center could be unrelated to the topic of discussion so its de se thoughts need not to be considered, e.g. However we can also think and express from others’ perspectives with a theory (. The natural first-person perspective is most primitive. With each perspective there is a center, or using the term broadly, a self. The main argument can be summarized as follows: -/- Our thoughts, reasonings and narratives inherently comes from a certain perspective. Solutions to the Sleeping Beauty Problem and the Doomsday argument are discussed in detail. This paper proposes a new explanation for the paradoxes related to anthropic reasoning.

The literature has since exploded in size. Important early papers defending 1/2 include White 2006 and Meacham 2008.

Important early papers defending 1/3 include Arntzenius 2003, Dorr 2002, Horgan 2004, and Hitchcock 2004. Lewis 2001 responded, defending the 1/2 answer. The problem was first raised in the philosophical literature by Elga 2000, who defended the 1/3 answer. The question which constitutes the problem is this: "When she is first awakened, what degree of belief will she have that the outcome of the coin toss is Heads?" The problem has proven exceedingly difficult to solve and attracts attention both for its intrinsic interest and because of the many connections between the correct answer to the problem and a wide variety of other philosophical topics including: the status of chance-credence and frequency-credence principles, the evidential relevance of essentially indexical information, the acceptability of conditionalization principles, the proper understanding of Dutch Book arguments, the status of indifference principles, and the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, after each waking, she is put back to sleep with a drug that erases her memories of the waking. Depending on the toss of a fair coin, she is awakened once (Heads) or twice (Tails). The Sleeping Beauty Problem concerns a perfectly rational agent who is put to sleep for two days.